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Abstract
This letter addresses the second-degree price discrimination issue when a mo-
nopolized product is tied with environmental quality. The monopolist may degrade
environmental quality too much when marginal valuations of environmental quality
and the good itself are positively related across consumers.
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1 Introduction
The famous discussion of railroad tari¤s for passenger tra¢c in Dupuit (1849) suggests
that a monopolist nds it advantageous both to degrade the quality intended for the poor
and enhance that intended for the rich in order to discriminate prices.
What the company is trying to do is prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class
fare from traveling third-class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to frighten
the rich. . . And it is again for the same reason that the companies, having proved almost cruel
to the third-class passengers and mean to the second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with
rst-class passengers. Having refused the poor what is necessary, they give the rich what is
superuous.1
Most of the formal models stemming from Mussa and Rosen (1978) have emphasized
that imperfect discrimination leads to a degradation in the quality of the product o¤ered
to the consumers with a low willingness-to-pay. This makes the product less attractive
to consumers with a high willingness-to-pay, which allows the monopolist to segment
the market. One exception is Srinagesh and Bradburd (1989) who demonstrate the idea
that quality discrimination can also lead to providing too much quality to the consumers
with a high willingness-to-pay. The common intuition underlying these results is that
asymmetric information creates a negative externality for the monopolist. Internalizing
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this externality requires preventing consumers of one type from switching to the quality
intended for another type.
In this literature, quality is treated as an excludable characteristic of the good, that
is, the user of the good tied2 with one level of quality can be excluded from consuming
the good tied with another level of quality. If however quality is environmental, than
no one can be prevented from enjoying the level of environmental quality o¤ered to the
users of the good, whatever the quantity purchased. Our purpose is to examine the
provision of environmental quality by a discriminating monopolist in a model that treats
environmental quality not only as a vertical attribute3 of the monopolized good, but also
as a non-excludable characteristic.
In our model, consumer preferences are such that there is a positive correlation between
the valuation of the tying good and the tied environmental quality, as illustrated for
instance by a ski resort. Indeed, we expect a consumer with a high willingness-to-pay
for the ski resort to be more environmentally friendly too. In this note, we show that
the monopolist may provide an ine¢ciently low level of environmental quality given the
pricequantity combinations o¤ered to consumers. This result departs from the view
popularized by Buchanan (1969) that a polluting monopolist behaves in a more e¢cient
way than does a polluting competitive rm because the output reduction due to the
exercise of monopoly power scales down the harm done to the environment (see also
Barnett (1980), for more on this point).
2 The model
The monopolist supplies a good or a service tied with an environmental service to the
consumer. This service provides environmental quality at some level measured by the
index e. Environmental quality will be treated as a public good that is not excludable.
The level of environmental quality is set by the monopolist, i.e., e is a choice variable. If,
for instance, the monopolist provides recreational activities by a lake, he will also control
the quality of water and the cleanliness of the banks. Similarly, the choice of environmental
quality in a ski resort may be determined by a number of variables including the fuel-
e¢ciency of ski lifts, the ski resort location and its blending into the natural surroundings.
The monopolist faces a demand composed of two types of consumers di¤erentiated by
their taste for the good. There is no exogenous signal of each consumer type i = 1; 2.
The proportion of consumer type i in the market place is i.
Assume a quasi-linear utility function for consumers of type i
ui = bi(qi; e) + xi (1)
where xi is consumption of the numeraire commodity, qi is the consumption of the good
tied with environmental quality e, and bi(0; e) = 0. Our specication of preferences follows
Carbone and Smith (2007) in that the environmental externality is not separable from
private consumption. This captures an environmental feedback on demand: changes in
environmental quality do inuence the consumption behavior.
2Tying is the practice requiring the consumer of one good (or service) to also purchase a second good
(or service).
3This assumption follows the recent approach in the environmental literature. It can be found for
instance in Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003), Amacher et al. (2004)
and André et al. (2009).
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We normalize the price of numeraire to equal 1, and we let ti denote total spending
on the quantity of good purchased by consumer i from the monopolist.
Consumer is budget constraint is
ti + xi = ri (2)
where ri is the consumers initial endowment of the numeraire. We can write net utility
as
ui = bi(qi; e)  ti + ri (3)
Partial derivatives @bi=@qi = Pi (qi; e) and @bi=@e represent, respectively, consumer is
marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for the good and his MWTP for environmental
quality.
Assumptions 1: For all (q; e), b1(q; e) < b2(q; e) and @b1=@q = P1 (q; e) < @b2=@q =
P2 (q; e).
High-demand consumers 2 are willing to pay more than low-demand consumers 1 for
both a given amount of the good and environmental quality. Moreover, high-demand
consumers MWTP exceeds that of low-demand consumers.
We will specialize the model so that bi (q; e) = eq (i   q=2), where i represents the
taste for the good, with 1 < 2. This specication extends Mussa and Rosen (1978)
to preferences dened over a public good. MWTPs are Pi (q; e) = e (i   q) for the
good and @bi=@e = q (i   q=2) for environmental quality. Note that, for all q such that
Pi (q; e) > 0, we have @bi=@e > 0, that is, both types of consumers 1 and 2 prefer the good
to be more environmentally friendly. This follows the recent approach in environmental
literature that considers environmental quality as a vertical attribute of the good. In
addition, @b1=@e < @b2=@e means that the high-demand consumers are more concerned
about environmental quality than the low-demand consumers. This ts in with outdoor
leisure activities such as skiing, sailing, walking or shing since the more people are fond
of such activities, the more they feel concerned about the environment.
Let the cost of producing one unit of the good tied with environmental quality e be
c(e), where c(e) is an increasing and convex function of e. This implies that a cleaner
good is more costly to produce: the resources allocated by the monopolist to pollution
abatement and wastes cleanup raise the production costs. To make things interesting, we
will assume that supplying the good to any type of consumer on the market is socially
e¢cient, that is,
Assumption 2: 1  
c(e)
e
> 0.
3 Social optimum
Given that the total amount of the numeraire available for distribution among consumers
is
2X
i=1
iri   c(e)
2X
i=1
iqi, the optimization problem of the benevolent planner is
maxq1;q2;eW (q1; q2; e) 
2X
i=1
ibi(qi; e) +
2X
i=1
iri   c(e)
2X
i=1
iqi
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Assuming an interior solution (q1; q

2; e
), conditions for a social optimum are
Pi (q

i ; e
) = c(e); i = 1; 2 (4)
2X
i=1
i@bi=@e = c
0(e)
2X
i=1
iq

i (5)
From (4), social e¢ciency requires that the low- and high-demand consumers have the
same MWTP for the good, equal to the marginal cost of producing the good. Moreover, by
condition (5), the weighted sum of MWTPs for environmental quality equals the marginal
cost of providing this quality.
4 First-degree price discrimination
Suppose rst that the monopolist perfectly observes the type of each consumer. The
monopolist wants to o¤er consumers i = 1; 2 some price, quantity and environmental
quality combination (ti; qi; e) that yields the maximum prot. This combination is a take
it or leave it o¤er: consumer i can either pay ti, consume qi and enjoy environmental
quality e, or buy and pay nothing.
The prot maximization problem of the monopolist is
maxt1;t2;q1;q2;e
2X
i=1
i (ti   c(e)qi)
such that bi(qi; e)  ti  0; i = 1; 2 (IR).
Individual rationality constraints (IR) require that each type of consumer be willing
to purchase. Equality will hold for each one since the monopolist wants ti to be as large
as possible.
bi(qi; e)  ti = 0; i = 1; 2 (6)
Substituting from the constraints, we get exactly the same optimization problem as that
faced by the benevolent planner. Note that the monopolist behaves in a socially desirable
way here because all consumer surplus goes to the monopolist.
5 Second-degree price discrimination
Suppose now that the monopolist cannot tell the consumers apart. Due to asymmetric
information, consumers may have the temptation to choose the wrong combination of
price, quantity, and environmental quality, i.e., the one not intended for their type. In
addition to previous individual rationality constraints, two further incentive compatibility
constraints, (ICi) ; i = 1; 2, now bind the monopolist. The problem facing the monopolist
is
max
t1;t2;q1;q2;e
2X
i=1
i (ti   c(e)qi) (7)
s:t:
8>><
>>:
b1(q1; e)  t1  b1(q2; e)  t2 (IC1)
b2(q2; e)  t2  b2(q1; e)  t1 (IC2)
b1(q1; e)  t1  0 (IR1)
b2(q2; e)  t2  0 (IR2)
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As a preliminary result, we demonstrate that the output quantities now supplied to both
types of consumers verify qm1  q
m
2 .
Adding (IC1) to (IC2) yields
b1(q1; e)  b2(q1; e)  b1(q2; e)  b2(q2; e): (8)
From Assumptions 1, we have @b1=@q @b2=@q < 0. Thus, inequality (8) implies q
m
1  q
m
2 .
Let us now show that inequalities (IC2) and (IR1) are binding constraints in the
solution of the monopolists problem.
As usual, the proof is by contradiction. Indeed, suppose it is not so. Then the
monopoly could either raise t2 or (and) t1 by a small amount so that market segmentation
remains unchanged, i.e., the high-demand consumer is still worse o¤ switching to the
combination (t1; q1; e) intended for the low-demand consumer, and the latter still accepts
(t1; q1; e). This would increase the monopolists prot, thereby leading to a contradiction:
such an increase cannot happen in a prot-maximizing solution.
Hence, the binding constraints (IR1) and (IC2) yield
b1(q1; e) = t1 and (9)
t1   t2 = b2(q1; e)  b2(q2; e): (10)
In the solution of the prot-maximizing problem, the monopoly extracts the whole surplus
of the low-demand consumer, as shown by (9). Moreover, equality (10) says that high-
demand consumers are charged the highest price that just induces their consumption of
the quantity directed at them.
Turning now to constraints (IR2) and (IC1), we show that they can be eliminated as
being nonbinding.
First, (IR1) and (IC2) immediately imply (IR2) since b1(q1; e) < b2(q1; e). Hence,
the high-demand consumer obtains here an extra surplus u2   r2 > 0 compared to the
rst-best solution.
Second, using (10), the constraint (IC1) can be rewritten
b1(q1; e)  b1(q2; e)  b2(q1; e)  b2(q2; e) = t1   t2: (11)
From Cauchys generalized mean value theorem, there exists at least one q with q1 < q <
q2 such that
b1(q1; e)  b1(q2; e)
@b1(q)=@q
=
b2(q1; e)  b2(q2; e)
@b2(q)=@q
: (12)
We know from Assumptions 1 that @b1=@q < @b2=@q. As moreover q1  q2, we have
b2(q1; e)  b2(q2; e)  0, and so
[b2(q1; e)  b2(q2; e)]
@b1(q)=@q
@b2(q)=@q
> b2(q1; e)  b2(q2; e): (13)
Using (10), this inequality can be rewritten
[b2(q1; e)  b2(q2; e)]
P1 (q; e)
P2 (q; e)
> t1   t2: (14)
Furthermore (12) implies
b1(q1; e)  b1(q2; e) = [b2(q1; e)  b2(q2; e)]
P1 (q; e)
P2 (q; e)
: (15)
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We nally conclude from (14) that
b1(q1; e)  b1(q2; e) > t1   t2: (16)
Therefore, inequality (IC1) will be a nonbinding constraint.
This simplication in the number of relevant constraints leaves us with both binding
constraints (IC2) and (IR1). Substituting (9) and (10) into (7), we obtain a reduced
program maxq1;q2;e (q1; q2; e). Assuming an interior solution (q
m
1 ; q
m
2 ; e
m), the rst-order
conditions based on the e¤ective constraints are
P2(q
m
2 ; e
m) = c(em) (17)
P1(q
m
1 ; e
m) +
2
1
(P1(q
m
1 ; e
m)  P2(q
m
1 ; e
m)) = c(em) (18)
1@b1(q
m
1 ; e
m)=@e+ 2@b2(q
m
2 ; e
m)=@e  2 (@b2(q
m
1 ; e
m)=@e  @b1(q
m
1 ; e
m)=@e) (19)
= c0(em)(2q
m
2 + 1q
m
1 ):
Conditions (17) and (18) yield the familiar result of monopolistic imperfect quantity
discrimination: the high-demand consumer purchases the socially optimal amount of the
good, while the low-demand consumer purchases an ine¢ciently small amount of the
good. In the words of Dupuit (1849), the monopolist hits the poor with a reduction in
quantity because the low-demand consumer su¤ers relatively less from reduced quantity
than the high-demand consumer. This makes the combination (tm1 ; q
m
1 ; e
m) less attractive
to the high-demand consumer.
Using the specication bi (q; e) = eq (i   q=2), we obtain from (18)
qm1 = 1  
2
1
(2   1) 
c(em)
em
: (20)
Observe that 2 must be su¢ciently low to get the existence of an interior solution for q
m
1 .
More precisely, qm1 > 0 only if 2 <  
1 c(em)=em
2 c(em)=em
. When the proportion of high-demand
consumers is above , the monopolist is worse o¤ attracting low-demand consumers to the
market. Given qm1 = 0, the monopolist provides the socially e¢cient level of environmental
quality to high-demand consumers since condition (19) can be rewritten
@ (qm1 ; q
m
2 ; e
m)
@e
=
@W (qm1 ; q
m
2 ; e
m)
@e
= 0: (21)
Suppose now 2 < , so that low-demand consumers are not excluded from the market.
From (4), we know that q1 = 1  
c(em)
em
. From (20), second-degree price discrimination
involves a 2
1
(2   1) reduction in the quantity intended for low-demand consumers.
If we specialize the model as previously mentioned, we have @b2(q1; e)=@e @b1(q1; e)=@e =
q1 (2   1) > 0. Substituting this into (19), we have
@ (qm1 ; q
m
2 ; e
m)
@e
=
@W (qm1 ; q
m
2 ; e
m)
@e
  2q
m
1 (2   1) = 0: (22)
Thus, qm1 > 0 implies
@W(qm1 ;qm2 ;em)
@e
> 0, and so, given (qm1 ; q
m
2 ), the monopolist pro-
vides an ine¢ciently low level of environmental quality. The intuition is that consumers
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private information induces the high-demand consumer to switch to the monopolists
o¤er of the combination designed for the low-demand consumer. This masquerade re-
duces the high-demand consumers valuation of environmental quality from @b2(q2; e)=@e
to @b2(q2; e)=@e   (@b2(q1; e)=@e  @b1(q1; e)=@e). As can be seen in the left-hand side of
(19), the monopolist internalizes the inclination of high-demand consumers to pay less for
environmental quality than they are actually willing to pay. This yields level of environ-
mental quality which is too low.
Proposition 1. If qm1 < q

1 and q
m
2 = q

2, then
 if   2, the monopolist removes the low-demand consumers from the market and
provides the socially e¢cient level of environmental quality;
 if 0 < 2 < , the monopolist serves both types of consumers and underprovides
environmental quality.
Following the evocative expression of Dupuit (1849), the monopolist hits the poor
twice when their group is so large that 2 < . First, the monopolist reduces the output
quantity in the combination proposed to low-demand consumers, in order to make it
unattractive to high-demand consumers. Second, the monopolist o¤ers an ine¢ciently
low level of environmental quality, thereby hitting the rich too. The reason is that
the monopolist underestimates the high-demand consumers valuation of environmental
quality by internalizing their tendency to masquerade as low-demand consumers. This
result may explain why the environment is not su¢ciently protected in very popular sites
supplying recreational activities. If, for instance, the environmental indicator is how the
buildings and infrastructure of a ski resort melt into the background, laxity on this point
is more likely to be observed in places crowded with low-demand consumers. When the
group of high-demand consumers is so large that   2, the monopolist deters low-
demand consumers from purchasing the good and sets the e¢cient level of environmental
quality.
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